Talk:Hamas

This page is subject to the extended confirmed restriction related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Recognition of Israel - repeated removal of sources information

Yet again the statement Other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine was removed even though it's supported by three reliable sources. We were left only with one viewpoint ([Hamas is] acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side) which is a violation of WP:NPOV. Alaexis_¿question? 22:58, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

Please, names and numbers, Alaexis. Who are the villains who do such things? Are they for instance the individuals who frustrate also my attempts at improving the article, forcing me to start two talk sections here, one a few munutes ago, the other earlier today? If you don't name them, then why do you place this 'message' on this talk page? --Corriebertus (talk) 23:36, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

We should be debating issues rather than personalities. In any case the editor who removed this information responded below. Alaexis_¿question? 12:37, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

Right, that line got inadvertently cut out because you went against the agreed upon consensus version proposed by VR and added it to the page in the first paragraph here rather than where we agreed it would be. Have restored it there, along with the rest of the agreed upon VR version. Please stop removing the Marzouk and Usher RS-backed information that was in the consensus VR version. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:03, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

Thanks for adding it to the beginning of the policies section. However, it should also be mentioned in the Recognition section as well, otherwise the reader would only see that Hamas is acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side and would get only a partial picture, not in line with WP:NPOV. Alaexis_¿question? 12:36, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

? It is in the recognition section, per VR's version. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:53, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

Where? This section in the current version of the article says nothing about Hamas's long term goals. Alaexis_¿question? 21:22, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

@Alaexis Again, it is there per VR's version: In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto."[94] But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[117][44] @Corriebertus this is the agreed version that we have consensus for. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:32, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

Thanks for the answer. The problem is that in the beginning of this section it's said that Hamas is acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side, so to satisfy NPOV we need to move the long-term goals to the same paragraph. Our sources talk about both and both are important for the reader to get a holistic picture.

You can't say that this is the consensus version now that there are at least 2 editors who disagree with it. Alaexis_¿question? 21:48, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

This is the version that had consensus to be put up, which I, alongside @Vice regent and @Smallangryplanet and yourself supported. It has nothing to do with satisfying NPOV, as the following line already notes the debate regarding the point of recognition: "Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated." The point about some scholars believing it retains its long-term objective is not relevant to include here to satisfy that. The reason it was placed there is exactly to ensure NPOV as the following Baconi source directly addresses that point. So if you start adjusting the order of that, the entire structure of the section is put into question, and you have reneged on your prior stated agreement to put up this version.

In your latest edit you further violated your own prior agreement with the VR version by removing parts you suddenly no longer appear to like. That is your right, but then we will have to proceed to a formal RfC on it. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:48, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

I don't believe that I have ever supported this version. This is definitely not a consensus version.

A long-term goal to conquer all of the former Mandatory Palestine is hardly compatible with the future recognition so it makes sense to mention both viewpoints close to one another. Feel free to start an RfC. Alaexis_¿question? 23:28, 27 February 2025 (UTC)

Yes, I see “It is in the recognition section”… but very low, only in the fourth paragraph, where 98% of the visitors will never get … (because that whole section is terribly unreadable. Totally chaotic. I understand that you guys have discussed that section for a very long time; apparently to no avail at all; why didn’t anybody in the last year endeavour to organize this fuzzy section?) Anyway, this is not what Alaexis has demanded from you, Smp. --Corriebertus (talk) 23:10, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

Working ethics on article Hamas

There seems to be a tendency going on, on article Hamas, of a few highly active editors, imposing their will on the article by sneaky edits (hiding a not-motivated high-impact edit behind a marginal but motivated edit); generally neglecting or refusing to directly give a good and clear motivation as regards content for their own rather sweeping edits (but instead alluding to some (vaguely or not identified) ‘consensus’ version); reverting well-motivated edits of colleagues without revealing any motivation from themselves, just to ‘force’ their ‘opponent’ to turn to the talk page ‘for a consensus’; abusing, disturbing or sabotaging talk page discussions by not reacting on the basic issue at stake but instead digressing to marginal or even off-topic (side) questions, resorting there to flagrantly false reasoning and when attacked on that point simply not answering again, or simply fleeing from a discussion when their argument is proven incorrect – just to use that same false argument (possibly) again in a later, new discussion slightly related to the former one.

Especially when a few editors are much more intensively working on Wikipedia than the average contributor, it is rather easy for them with a combination of forementioned modes of operation to dominate the article, effectively blocking the ‘democratic’ means of their ‘opposing’ contributors to change anything relevant in the article, even though those opponents deliver arguments and the blocking, preserving editors ‘deliver’ nothing but procedural barricades and (forementioned) tricks. This ‘blocking’ behaviour can only lead to Edit Wars, in which ofcourse the most time-intensive (full-time) contributors will always score the victory.

I propose the colleagues, to always give a clear motivation as regards content for any edits here; to not revert edits of others by only pointing at presumed or alleged formal/procedural grounds but always also by reacting on content; and in talk page discussions to react to the core issue and not only digress.

I’d like to hear a reaction at least from @Alaexis:, VR=@Vice regent:, @Smallangryplanet:, @Aquillion:. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:23, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

• If you have conduct issues with other editors, the thing to do is to take them to WP:AE or WP:ANI (with diffs - it's important to provide diffs about the conduct you're talking about to avoid WP:ASPERSIONs.) --Aquillion (talk) 14:11, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

  Agreed.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 19:22, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

  I also agree with this. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:51, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

@Corriebertus, apologies for the delayed answer, I've been a bit busy lately.

I agree with some of your points. I'm not a big fan of AE/ANI, so I'd prefer to run RfCs to try to resolve disagreements this way. Hopefully it'll help.

Please be aware there is a limit of 1,000 words per editor in formal discussions per WP:PIA. Alaexis_¿question? 23:32, 27 February 2025 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 2 March 2025

The ancient Hebrew word Hamas from the old testament is translated as “violence”. Tperck (talk) 06:18, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 07:17, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

It's an Arabic acronym so this does not appear to be any more relevant than it being a name for boys in Urdu. What might be interesting is if there is secondary source coverage of efforts to use the ancient Hebrew word and the old testament for social engineering of attitudes towards an enemy of Israel, but that would probably be something for a different article. Sean.hoyland (talk) 07:19, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

RfC: Recognition of Israel section - due weight

What weight should the following viewpoints be given in the Recognition of Israel section, in terms of prominence and proximity to each other? The latest round of the discussion can be found here but there were many related discussions and I believe that at this point we need external input.

1. Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.
2. Hamas accepted the 1967 borders in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side.

Options

• About the same
• 1 should have greater weight
• 2 should have greater weight
• Other - please explain. Alaexis_¿question? 09:49, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

Discussion

Hamas's long-term goals are not in question and are supported by multiple reliable sources

• The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety
• In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas's original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible
• there is no doubt that ... Hamas is focused on ... destroying the 'Zionist entity'

While this section addresses recognition in its narrow definition, it also discusses related topics such as Hamas's stance on the 1967 borders. Therefore, omitting their long-term goals would violate NPOV. Even sources generally sympathetic to Hamas acknowledge the dichotomy

Hamas has always oscillated between its attachment to the ‘historical solution’, which foresees the liberation of the whole of Palestine, and its capacity to recognize the validity of the ‘interim solution’, which prescribes the creation of a state with the 1967 borders

There are no RS that dispute these long-term goals. On the other hand, the acceptance of the 1967 borders and "implicit recognition" are seen as a tactical move by some and as genuine by others. Therefore the long-term goals should be given greater weight. Alaexis_¿question? 09:48, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

(Invited by the bot) I don't have the depth of knowledge of this article to answer such a nuanced complex question. I started looking at it wanted to note one observation. In discussing a past, present or possible present objective of the destruction of Israel, instead of stating that directly this article uses complex obscure terms and terms of art to say that. Sincerely, North8000 (talk) 01:30, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

What exactly does "having greater weight" in the section mean? Based on your previous edit to that section, I assume you mean putting the line about “others believe it retains it as a long-term objective” in the first paragraph. I have now gone ahead and done that, with the addition of the directly relevant point by Baconi. We can proceed with an RfC on that or whatever other specific changes you want to make if you like, but as proposed currently this is too broadly phrased.

Also, and importantly: it's not true that the nature of the long-term position is indicative of a refusal to ever officially recognise Israel. RS say Hamas is amenable to officially recognising Israel as part of a permanent solution:

Despite the often-cited rhetoric in Hamas’s discourse about the impossibility of recognizing Israel, there actually is a visible thread of thinking that offers just such a possibility, though only if Israel reciprocated positively. After assuming his new post in early April 2006, Hamas’s foreign minister Mahmoud al-Zahhar sent a letter to Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, declaring that his government would be willing to live in peace, side by side with ‘its neighbours’, based on a two-state solution. However, other statements attributed to Hamas leaders have implied that the issue of recognizing Israel should be one of the goals of negotiations, not the prerequisite to them...To reconcile the extreme of the liberation of the entire historic land of Palestine with the realities of the existence of Israel on the ground, Hamas has suggested resorting to a national referendum on the final settlement to be concluded by Israel and the Palestinians. The democratically elected Hamas will abide by whatever the Palestinian people decide concerning their own fate, in a free and democratic referendum. By Hamas’s way of thinking, the referendum idea is a decent solution to the theoretical and practical impasse that could result, and be exclusively, if wrongly, put down to Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel and accept the principle of a two-state solution. (Hroub, 2006, Hamas: A Beginner's Guide, pp. 40-41)

Michael Schulz (2020, Between Resistance, Sharia Law, and Demo-Islamic Politics, p. 70) says that the 2017 Hamas Charter statement on the two-state solution being a formula of national consensus shows a readiness on the part of Hamas to accept such a solution permanently even if it wasn't its own preference, provided it could be shown to be the declared will of the Palestinian people. According to Schulz, this would require a legitimate future referendum involving all Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as well as those living in the Diaspora.

Tristan Dunning, author of several books and articles on Hamas, has also said this: Indeed, it [Hamas] has been amenable to some kind of permanent solution with Israel since the mid-1990s. For years, Hamas has quite clearly stated that it would accept a two-state solution, provided the deal is put to a referendum and approved by the Palestinian people.

Gunning, 2007, p. 237, Hamas in Politics: Pragmatists, like absolutists, insist that the legitimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the abolition of Israel, the return of the estimated 4.5 million Palestinian refugees living abroad (PASSIA, 2006) and the creation of an Islamic state in all of Palestine. But they claim that it is in the national interest to concede that Israel is here to stay, and to use all means at their disposal, including both political compromise and (the threat of) resistance, to create a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Yassin’s notion of a long-term /udnah is an attempt to balance these two logics. It does not give up its claim to the land of Palestine but it allows it to suspend this claim if the popular will believes this to be in the national interest. In the words of Ahmad Ahmad, senior Hamas legislator from Nablus: “I will negotiate for my usurped rights from the river to the sea, but I will suspend my rights over what was seized before 1967 in order to achieve all my rights that were taken after 1967” (ICG, 2006a: 20).

Baconi also says the following in relation to the point about using mutual recognition as a bargaining chip, but also in reference to the acceptance of the national consensus formula (2018, p.230):

Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept those outcomes until the deal is implemented.

Alsoos (2021), the source for the two-phase point, discusses this in terms of realpolitik pragmatism (pp. 838-839): Conversely, in the Introductory Memorandum cooperation was conditioned on the ‘non-recognition’ of the state of Israel and rejection of the Oslo peace accord of 1993. In the early 2000s, conditional non-recognition was dropped when ‘democratic elections’ became the criteria deciding interactions and ongoing intra-Palestinian power struggles, including the potential for Hamas’s integration into the PLO.

Regarding your sources, the Bar-On, Tamir; Bale, Jeffrey M. (2024) source has a throwaway line on how Hamas "no doubt" intends to destroy Israel. It does not provide any analysis or sourcing for this claim, it is not from subject-matter experts, and the book is not about Hamas. There is no value in adding it, imo.

The same is true of the second source you note. It essentially reiterates what Alsoos and Mishal already say, except it does not provide any sources, does not engage in any analysis, and mischaracterises the context as added by Alsoos, Mishal and others regarding the multi-phase approach. I have added Mishal as a separate source instead.

As the section currently stands, it also does not include many sources, including those I have cited here, that explicitly say Hamas is open to a permanent solution with Israel including official recognition. But I am fine with leaving those out as Baconi suffices for that point.

Finally, while we’re at it, your description of Seurat–a leading academic subject-matter expert on Hamas–as being sympathetic to them is bordering on WP:JUSTDONTLIKEIT. You also quote Seurat out of context, who has a comment about oscillation in the introduction – where she is describing specifically the move from the early rejectionist phase to its later acquiescing phase. Seurat repeatedly stresses that Hamas has implicitly recognised Israel. Many other experts and other RS make the point that Hamas has implicitly recognised Israel, and some –like Brenner– go even further, saying the group has "de facto" recognised it (2022, p. 206). All of these sources are already on the page, but again, I see no need to add more of them in this section. Smallangryplanet (talk) 18:09, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

Thanks for making the change. If we can reach consensus that way, this would be great. I'll tweak the text a bit tomorrow, let me know what you think.

Regarding the sources you've provided, they do represent the viewpoint that Hamas is amenable to some kind of an agreement with Israel. This viewpoint definitely exists and I do not suggest purging it from the article. Note that Gunning also says that the legitimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the abolition of Israel and that they are willing to suspend my rights over what was seized before 1967. Suspension is usually understood to be temporary.

Also note that Baconi is a scholar *and* an activist so he's likely to be biased, which we should take into account when determining due weight. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

Your latest edit does not accurately say what the consensus in the RS says. It is not "According to some scholars" that Hamas repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders, it is a factual matter that they have done so in the listed agreements. Elsewhere on the page this is also said in Wikivoice, as in the lede: "While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders". And it should be, as it is the consensus view in the scholarship.

The only area of disagreement is the question of whether they would also accept it in the long-term, and that is currently accurately portrayed in the introductory paragraph with both sides represented.

Also your claim about Baconi being an "activist" and hence "likely biased" is based on him being a fellow and president at an independent Palestinian policy network. That does not detract from his value as a subject-matter expert, and the source we cite for him is from a highly reputable academic publisher (Stanford University Press). Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:06, 7 March 2025 (UTC)

I understand the point you made in your edit summary. However the second part of the sentence (thus acknowledging the existence of an entity on the other side) is not found in any of the agreements and therefore is a conclusion drawn by experts. We should attribute this second part of the sentence. Alaexis_¿question? 12:43, 8 March 2025 (UTC)

Yes that part is indeed attributed. However, it is attributed to "many" scholars on the page in its first references in the lede and the introductory paragraph to the "Policies toward Israel and Palestine" category, with the "while others" right after. I have added that to the introductory paragraph of the recognition section as well per the standard. To make it be in logical order the "subject of debate" line has to be put at the start, so I have also done that. This should resolve the issue. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 21:38, 8 March 2025 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not a reliable source, so it doesn't matter what is written in the lede. Perhaps we'll need to fix it as well. In both cases we have a handful of sources that make a certain claim, there is no justification for writing "many" in one case and "some" in the other. Alaexis_¿question? 08:45, 9 March 2025 (UTC)

References

References

Alaexis_¿question? 09:21, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

Edit request 3 March 2025

Description of suggested change: Hamas supports that kids be part his attacks. Some of those recruited by Hamas are 16 years old and older. According to the two reports, some of those recruited by Hamas are 16 years old and older, meaning children. https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/06/18/hamas-resorts-to-enlisting-16-year-olds-in-desperate-attempt-to-shore-up-manpower/ https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%87/ According to the following source, Hamas and Islamic Jihad considered teenagers to be adults if they were 16 years old or older. https://web.archive.org/web/20080708233017/http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/02/isrlpa9591.htm

"Some leaders, including representatives of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, have said that they consider children of 16 to be adults. International law defines"

The attack and the children who carried it out have received a host of sympathetic responses. A Hamas-affiliated news website published an infographic titled “The Lion Cubs of Vengeance” (Eshbal al-Thar), glorifying three children and the attacks they carried out. The infographic reads: “The Lion Cubs of Vengeance, Palestinian boys aged 12-15, a new generation of lone wolves, rushing to oppose the occupation, taking the [adult] perpetrators of the attacks as an example, the occupation fails to anticipate their actions.” source: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%97/ "Children, women with strollers and the elderly: Hamas observers who pass information to Sinwar" https://news.walla.co.il/item/3633850 from 2019 https://www.inn.co.il/news/409233 Diff:

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Hamas supports that kids be part his attacks. Some of those recruited by Hamas are 16 years old and older.

2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:A862:2B5F:C62E:A99C (talk) 20:41, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/children-in-the-service-of-palestinian-terrorism-security-tensions-incitement-in-the-social-networks-and-favorable-public-reactions-may-influence-more-children-to-carry-out-terrorist-attacks/ 2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:A862:2B5F:C62E:A99C (talk) 21:04, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{Edit extended-protected}} template. 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 11:34, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

There wasn't even a discussion here. Patience. 2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:401:8E06:7FDB:13F7 (talk) 13:14, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

Edit request 5 March 2025

Description of suggested change: I think it is necessary to describe the messianic-religious aspect of Hamas's ideology that has been exposed. Hamas' invasion plan, known in Israel as the "Wall of Jericho," appears in Arabic as "Al Wa'd Al-Akhira," ("The Last Promise"). In Islam, the phrase has messianic interpretations of the term (Surah Al-Fatiha). https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hj0oxoni1e https://x.com/SuleimanMas1/status/1896980229501100124. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hj0oxoni1e . This was Hamas' plan for October 7.

According to an investigation by the Israeli army, although the document accurately described Hamas's intentions to break through the Gaza Division's defenses with 4,000 terrorists and reach cities deep inside Israel, it was perceived as a "future idea" aimed at building strength and not as a real threat

https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/2025_q1/Article-4f7e561ab634591026.htm

According to the investigation by the Israeli intelligence service, the Shin Bet, the initial "Jericho Wall" document from 2018 and the updated version from 2022 were in the hands of the Shin Bet but were not processed properly. The answer to the professional failure ranges from a lack of control by professional oversight bodies, which were supposed to expose the process, to a saturation of intelligence information. Another insight that emerged during the incisive investigation is that capabilities must be investigated and monitored - and not necessarily just intentions - in order to build the threat Attribution. https://news.walla.co.il/item/3731917

On September 30, 2021, Hamas held a “Last Promise” conference at the Commodore Hotel in the Gaza Strip, where participants discussed the future management of Israel after its occupation.

According to Sufyan Abu Zaida, about two years before the October 7 massacre, the Hamas leadership began to speak in religious terms about the “Day of Judgment” and the fulfillment of the “Last Promise” (al-Wa’d al-Akhir), according to which all humanity will be Muslim in the end times. According to Hamas members, the Day of Judgment and the “promise” can be hastened by killing the “infidels” or forcibly converting them to Islam. This interpretation permeates Hamas’s messages.

https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/2024-04-04/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/0000018e-a379-d315-ab9f-aff98d4b0000

That is, a messianic religious concept has been integrated into Hamas' ideology.

Diff:

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A religious view has developed in Hamas ideology according to which fighting will bring the Islamic Day of Judgment closer.

2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:F14F:DC4F:E170:C25E (talk) 10:49, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{Edit extended-protected}} template. 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 11:34, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

There wasn't even a discussion here. N: I would love another explanation for why a term from the end of days appears as the name of the conference (and program) organized by Hamas. 2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:401:8E06:7FDB:13F7 (talk) 13:12, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

"Hamas has named the October 7 raid plan "The Last Promise." This was reported today (Tuesday) on the evening news channel Kan 11. The actual meaning of the name given is "The Promise of Judgment Day," which is taken from the Quran, from a chapter that addresses the Jews - and warns them of a cruel punishment for "doing evil":

"If you do good - you will do good to yourselves, but if you do evil - you will be punished for your own sins. When the time of the last promise (the Day of Judgment) comes, they will humble themselves and enter the mosque (the Temple Mount), as they entered it the first time (the destruction of the First Temple) in order to destroy everything that has been built."

As early as September 30, Hamas held a conference in Gaza, headed by Yahya Sinwar, whose name is the same as the October 7 raid operation. At the conference, the participants discussed preparations for the state that will be established after the State of Israel is destroyed."

https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/867157/ 2A0D:6FC0:EA6:F900:401:8E06:7FDB:13F7 (talk) 14:37, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

<- Non-extendedconfirmed editors and IPs cannot 'establish consensus' because they can't participate in consensus forming discussions. Sean.hoyland (talk) 14:43, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

well edit requests aren't for controversial changes 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 16:50, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

True, but my point was really that the {{subst:ESp|c}} template response to edit requests is no use in cases covered by WP:ARBECR. Sean.hoyland (talk) 17:16, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

Ah, which template should I have used then? 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 18:15, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

Maybe {{subst:EEp|xy}} 'specific', the one that points at WP:EDITXY. See Template:EEp. Sean.hoyland (talk) 17:19, 13 March 2025 (UTC)

Edit request 13 March 2025

Description of suggested change: Add: A new study by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, named after Major General Meir Amit, reveals the transformation that took place in Hamas' strategic perception in the years leading up to the October 7 attack. The study, written by Dr. Uri Rost, a researcher and lecturer at Sapir College, is based on numerous documents seized in Gaza during the fighting and shows how the terrorist organization's concept of "destroying Israel" moved from a distant religious vision to a practical action plan. The documents reveal internal correspondence and letters between Sinwar and senior Iranian and Hezbollah officials, according to whom "Israel has become more vulnerable than before" and "the resistance has become stronger." According to: https://mobile.mako.co.il/news-military/2025_q1/Article-f3e2fc239009591027.htm?pId=173113802_685075&main_article=1 https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A1-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%96%D7%95/ Diff:

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ORIGINAL_TEXT

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CHANGED_TEXT

2A0D:6FC7:623:5727:5615:129B:C1E:9F9F (talk) 16:51, 13 March 2025 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 18:10, 13 March 2025 (UTC)

add the sentence to hamas history 2A0D:6FC7:703:4F6B:2574:4FB9:D8C9:AC4C (talk) 18:29, 13 March 2025 (UTC)